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Abstract 
Extant research on the relationship between political systems and state punitiveness 
has so far paid little attention to the impact that transition from one political system 
to another may have upon levels and patterns of state punitiveness. This risks not 
only exaggerating the degree to which given trends in state punitiveness are distinct to 
particular political systems, but also overlooking the legacy that punitive policies, 
practices or experiences under a prior political system may bequeath its successor. 
With a view to advancing a better understanding of the relationship between political 
systems and state punitiveness, we draw on the case of Greece, taking a long historical 
perspective to chart the trajectory of punitive state policies and practices in the 
country before, during and after its dictatorship of 1967-74. 
 
 
Introduction 
In recent years, there has been a growth in scholarly research on the relationship 
between political systems and state punitiveness. Although such scholarship has 
productively looked at a range of jurisdictions around the world, it has so far shown 
little concern with the effect that transition from one political system to another may 
have on levels and patterns of state punitiveness. This neglect risks not only 
exaggerating the degree to which given trends in state punitiveness are discrete to 
particular political systems, but also overlooking the legacy that punitive policies, 
practices or experiences under a prior political system may bequeath its successor.  
The tendency to neglect transition in the study of state punitiveness is 
particularly stark in cases of states that have moved from authoritarian to democratic 
rule. It is equally stark, however, that the burgeoning body of scholarship on 
democratic transition itself has paid only limited attention to state punitiveness. Over 
the last forty years, transition from authoritarian to democratic government has 
become a mainstream subject of study across a variety of disciplines, especially in 
political science, but also in sociology, law and criminology. The primary concern of 
pertinent literature has been to identify factors that facilitate or inhibit successful 
transition to a consolidated liberal democracy. What has largely been neglected to 
date is the relationship between, on one hand, a recent authoritarian past and, on the 
other hand, the forms and degree of punitiveness manifested by a state against 
criminal or allegedly subversive acts committed during and after transition to 
democracy. Indeed, whilst repression is widely regarded as an essential feature of 
authoritarian government, what little exists on the punitive impact of authoritarian 
legacies has typically overlooked levels and patterns of imprisonment, despite them 
comprising the core criminological indicator of state punitiveness. Insofar as 
scholarship on transitions has addressed the issue of state punitiveness in post-
authoritarian contexts, attention has been concentrated overwhelmingly on matters 
specific to what is called ‘transitional justice’: attitudes towards abuses carried out 
under authoritarian rule, whether or not such abuses are subject to formal 
investigation, the degree to which punishment and lustration are assigned to 
supporters of the previous regime and those who planned and perpetrated its crimes, 
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as well as the extent to which reparation is provided to victims (e.g., Sikkink, 2011; 
Pinto, 2010; Arthur, 2009; see further Cesarini and Hite, 2004).  
With a view to contributing to greater understanding of the relationship 
between political systems and state punitiveness through examining how the scale 
and scope of state punitiveness are affected by processes of transition from 
authoritarianism to democracy, this article focuses on the case of Greece. Between 
1967 and 1974, Greece was subject to rule by a military dictatorship, since which time 
disputes have raged in the public domain regarding the relationship between past 
repression in the country and subsequent punitive state policies and practices under 
democracy, generating a host of intriguing hypotheses that still await sustained and 
systematic scholarly research. In particular, the punitive excesses of the dictatorship 
are usually posited to have left a legacy of state leniency towards crime and disorder, 
and whilst some view this legacy as evidence of successful transition to a consolidated 
liberal democracy, others argue it has impeded the emergence of effective criminal 
justice policies and practices, or even stymied the maturation of the democratic polity 
itself (for a review, see Sotiris, 2013).  
Methodologically, our exploration of state punitiveness is in broad accord with 
a small but growing throng of penologists calling for recognition of the 
multidimensional nature of the concept (e.g., Tonry, 2007; Hamilton, 2014) in that 
we go beyond the standard use of imprisonment as a measure to include policing, 
surveillance and civil and criminal law.1 The logic behind this analytic move is not so 
much that state institutions are inextricably enmeshed in a complex web of mutual 
influence in terms of organisational discourse, financial and other resources, or 
practical procedures and operations. Although we acknowledge the validity of this 
point, our choice to extend the study of state punitiveness beyond imprisonment lies 
in the fact that other state institutions, carceral as well as non-carceral, may share a 
common capacity to assume punitive forms and bring about punitive effects. Policing, 
surveillance and civil and criminal legislation, for example, merit consideration as 
punitive instruments of the state insofar as they are excessively harsh or otherwise 
intimidatory, whether against segments of the population or the populace in its 
entirety (see, e.g., Harkin, 2015). In studying state punitiveness solely by reference to 
imprisonment, as penologists so often do, one not only risks obscuring the punitive 
consequences other state institutions may have in their own right. Ultimately, one 
risks undermining the magnitude of punitiveness as a whole, given that punishment is 
a process carried out cumulatively and simultaneously by an ensemble of different 
institutions (see, e.g., Feeley, 1979).  
We begin by reviewing extant research on the relationship between political 
systems and state punitiveness, and proceed to show how such research can be 
advanced through engagement with scholarship on democratisation in general and on 
Southern European transitions in particular. We go on to delve into state punitiveness 
in Greece, first by charting the long history of illiberal rule from which democratic 
transition emerged in the country after the fall of the junta in 1974, and then testing 
the ‘lenient legacy’ thesis by reference to two historical periods: the seven years 
following the end of the dictatorship, and the decades since 1981, the juncture at 
which the country is often thought to have achieved a consolidated liberal democracy. 
In concluding, we summarise our findings on the evolution of punitive state policies 
and practices in the specific context of post-dictatorial Greece, and highlight the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 For reasons of space, we do not include in this article consideration of other important indicators of 
state punitiveness, such as sentencing laws and practices, the quality of prison conditions, trends in the 
use of the death penalty, levels and patterns of immigration detention, and state censorship of the 
traditional and social media.  
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implications these findings bear both for the impact of democratic transition upon 
state punitiveness and, ultimately, for the relationship between political systems and 
state punitiveness itself.  
 
Political Systems and State Punitiveness 
In recent years, there has been growing scholarly interest in the relationship between 
political systems and state punitiveness, both in terms of whether certain levels and 
patterns of state punitiveness are distinct to particular political systems, and in terms 
of the politico-institutional and other factors that account for any observed 
similarities or differences. One fruitful but heretofore largely neglected avenue for 
exploring whether given trends in state punitiveness are discrete to specific political 
systems is to compare trends in state punitiveness before, during and after transition 
from authoritarianism to democracy. As a corollary of neglecting democratic 
transition, little attention has been paid to the impact that policies, practices or 
experiences under past authoritarian rule may have on the scale and scope of state 
punitiveness in the ensuing democratic environment.  
Indeed, the small body of work that has so far addressed state punitiveness in 
conjunction with democratic transition calls into question or otherwise complicates 
the distinction explicitly or implicitly supported in most extant research on political 
systems and state punitiveness, whereby democratic states are taken to be 
significantly less prone than their authoritarian counterparts to meting out punitive 
measures against criminal and allegedly subversive behaviours. Just as it has been 
found, for example, that key continuities in state punitiveness may obtain following 
transition from an authoritarian to a democratic regime, facilitated in good part by 
the legacy the former may bequeath the latter, so too instances of rupture have been 
explained by reference to the function an authoritarian legacy may perform as a 
bulwark against punitive policies and practices under democracy. The implications of 
such findings for the relationship between political systems and state punitiveness 
remain undertheorised, yet important clues can be traced in the broader literature on 
democratic transition as such, particularly in the significance this literature attaches 
and the difficulties it attributes to democratic consolidation, including the doubts it 
raises as to whether authoritarian and democratic regimes are invariably distinct. 
Insofar as penological scholarship has paid attention to the ways in which 
political systems relate to the scale and scope of state punitiveness, the overwhelming 
focus of this work to date has been on the more specific relationship between, on the 
one hand, democracy, and on the other hand, levels and patterns of imprisonment. In 
this regard, single-case studies have predominantly addressed the US experience over 
recent decades, probing the effect of different democratic features in the sense of 
either moderating or exacerbating the use of custodial punishment, from juries’ role 
in limiting the imposition of prison terms at the sentencing stage (Dzur, 2012), to the 
part played by electoral politics in fuelling rates of incarceration (Zimring et al., 2001; 
Garland, 2001). If again mainly with reference to the US, single-case research has also 
shown growing interest in the impact custodial punishment itself may have on 
democracy, particularly as concerns the detrimental implications of ‘mass 
incarceration’ for the quality and reach of structures and processes of political 
participation (Simon, 2007; Burch, 2013; Lerman and Weaver, 2014; Dilts, 2014; 
Wilderman et al., 2014).  
The relationship between political systems and state punitiveness in the form 
of imprisonment has thus far attracted surprisingly little international comparative 
analysis, notwithstanding important steps taken in this direction over the last decade 
or so. To the extent that democracies and non-democracies have been compared, 
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imprisonment rates have typically been found to be lower in the former (Greenberg, 
2002; Killias, 1986; Ruddell and Guevara Urbina, 2007). 2  Another body of 
international comparative scholarship has sought to account for variation in the use 
of custodial punishment across political systems by reference to politico-institutional 
as well as socio-economic arrangements, spanning, for example, constitutional 
structures, electoral systems, patterns of welfare provision, and labour market 
relations (see, e.g., Lacey, 2008; Cavadino and Dignan, 2006; Wacquant, 2009a). 
This literature, however, has restricted the scope of analysis to select democracies of 
the global North, and has tended to overlook the ways in which state punitiveness 
may be influenced by processes of democratisation. A notable exception is a 
comparative study of Latin American states and the US, which has identified links 
between efforts to broaden and deepen democracy, on one hand, and the expansion of 
harsh penal policies and practices, on the other (Beckett and Godoy, 2008).3  
Whilst not situating itself within the rubric of punitiveness per se, a further 
body of scholarship has explored the relationships that pertain between policing, 
surveillance, or law and political systems. Aside from a vast array of research on the 
ways in which policing relates to democracy, there has been a recent growth of 
literature on the intersections between policing and transitions to democracy. Much 
of this literature has been concerned with detailing, devising and evaluating 
stratagems to realise the potential contribution policing can make to democratic 
consolidation (see further Hinton and Newburn, 2009; Bayley, 2006). There are, 
however, a number of studies that have addressed persistence in punitive police 
missions and practices after transition to democracy (e.g., Green, 2000; Hathazy, 
2013a, 2013b; Jaime-Jimenez, 1997), including several that have stressed the role of 
non-democratic legacies in sustaining such trends (e.g., Pereira and Ungar, 2004; 
Morn and Toro, 1989), and others which have argued that non-democratic legacies 
actually proved inhibitive of punitive policing (e.g., Korbonski, 2005).  
A sizeable amount of research has meanwhile examined the tensions and 
complementarities that underpin the relationship between democracy and state 
surveillance. The practice of state surveillance has often been interpreted as standing 
in diametric opposition to democratic values, yet the two are not inevitably 
antithetical; there is evidence to suggest that surveillance practices can be facilitative 
of liberal democratic imperatives (see further Haggerty and Samatas, 2010). Albeit to 
a far lesser extent, research has also considered the legacies of surveillance practices 
under authoritarianism for the ensuing democratic regime (e.g., Samatas, 2004). It 
has been found, for example, that inadequate lustration in the field of surveillance can 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The very low number of criminological studies that compare levels and patterns of punishment across 
democratic and non-democratic states is no doubt due to the considerable pitfalls to be overcome by 
any such endeavour, ranging, for example, from the effects of political manipulation on the reliability 
of available data to the risks of distortion stemming from the use of unduly limited proxies of 
punishment in comparative international analysis (see further Nelken, 2015; Hamilton, 2014).  
3 Wacquant (2009b) has also looked at democracies of the global South (e.g., Greece, Portugal, Spain, 
Italy) in his international comparative account of punishment under conditions of neoliberalism, 
without, however, addressing the effect that processes of democratisation may have had on levels and 
patterns of punishment in the states concerned (although he has briefly touched on the issue in earlier 
research on crime control policies and practices in Brazil; see further Wacquant, 2003). The few single-
case analyses that have focused on the evolution of punishment in a context of transition from 
authoritarianism to democracy have mostly yielded findings similar to those reached by Beckett and 
Godoy (2008). There has been, for example, some work on democratisation and increased state 
punitiveness in post-apartheid South Africa, although placing greater emphasis on the contribution 
made by the legacy of the apartheid system, only marginally qualified by the counter-legacy of the anti-
apartheid struggle (Cavadino and Dignan, 2006: 92-100; see also Super, 2013). For a counter-example, 
see Melossi’s (1998) account of punishment in Italy under and after fascism. 
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produce a corrupting and destabilising effect on institutions of a nascent democracy, 
and even lead to the manipulation of crime discourse and crime control practices in 
the post-authoritarian period. In the case of several post-communist European states, 
former secret service personnel emerged from transition as an empowered elite across 
politics, the state and business, yet their controversial past made them susceptible to 
mutual blackmail, thereby leading to a steady stream of bribery and corruption 
scandals that would subvert public sector accountability and repeatedly rock public 
life. The criminality of this elite, in combination with its own alarmist calls for the 
advanced management of criminal risks, served to inflame public concerns about 
crime. This in turn not only fuelled demand for products and services from a newly 
privatised security industry itself dominated by former state security operatives, but 
also cultivated public support for the continuation of ubiquitous forms of state 
surveillance (Loś, 2002, 2010).  
As regards literature on the relationship between law and democracy, whilst 
the rule of law is commonly taken to be fundamental to an effective democracy, 
debates continue about the existence both of the rule of law in non-democracies (see 
further Habermas, 1995; Joerges and Singh Ghaleigh, 2003) and of ‘democratic 
deficits’ that are said to have afflicted the development and implementation of law in 
democratic jurisdictions (see, e.g., Godoy, 2005a, 2005b). There is a large corpus of 
scholarship addressing the importance of the rule of law in jurisdictions undergoing 
transition to democracy, particularly as concerns the merits of transitional justice and 
the most appropriate ways of achieving it. A less explored theme has been the legacy 
of non-democratic law for the emergent democratic polity, with extant research 
identifying ways in which legal cultures overcome, but may also reproduce, the 
authoritarianism of the previous system. Although, for example, the project of 
European integration has usually been understood as a reaction to the ‘dark’ interwar 
histories of member-states, alternative interpretations view it as a means by which 
authoritarian constitutional provisions and practices have been reasserted (Joerges 
and Singh Ghaleigh, 2003; see also Karstedt, 2009). 
Inasmuch as the strands of scholarship reviewed above have considered 
democratic transition, what their findings imply for the relationship between political 
systems and state punitiveness is usually left undeveloped, unclear or even altogether 
untouched. This is not least due to inattention to the punitive dimensions of non-
carceral state institutions in themselves, let alone to the constituent role these 
institutions play as parts of a continuum of state punitiveness. At the same time, 
literature preoccupied with democratic transition as such, albeit typically neglectful of 
state punitiveness, has generated a number of insights that are valuable not just in 
terms of framing the study of punitive trends before, during and after democratic 
transition, but also in terms of appreciating what such inquiry may reveal about the 
ways in which political systems relate to state punitiveness.  
This latter literature, also known as ‘transitology’, has identified discrete 
historical junctures at which attributes of the international environment have 
interacted with political and socio-economic contingencies at the national level to 
condition the quality, sustainability and outcomes of democratisation processes. 
Transitology has additionally demonstrated that the consolidation of democracy is a 
somewhat elusive goal, insofar as liberal democracies deemed to be ‘consolidated’ 
have actually proved more unstable and vulnerable to regression to authoritarianism 
than their classification suggests. Relatedly, transitology has lain bare the mutability 
of differences that may obtain between political systems at a particular point in time; 
indeed, qualitative disparities between democratic and authoritarian rule have been 
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shown to have become less distinct over recent decades (see further Luckham and 
White, 1996).  
As well as offering these general insights, transitological scholarship is 
particularly useful for our study of punitiveness in the specific context of post-
authoritarian Greece because it highlights the importance of the Greek case, if 
primarily as one of the lauded Southern European exemplars of successful democratic 
consolidation. In what follows, we briefly review the field of transitology and the place 
of Southern European transitions within it.  
 
Transitology and Southern European Exemplars 
From the mid-1970s until the mid-1990s, there was a confluence of states in various 
regions around the world abandoning dictatorship and adopting democratic forms of 
government. This period, following two similar episodes of democratisation that 
began in the early 1880s and during the Second World War, respectively, came to be 
known as the ‘third wave of democratisation’, a term famously coined by political 
scientist Samuel Huntington (1991). The very range of states engaging in democratic 
transition during the third wave encouraged a sense of optimism about the degree to 
which those that otherwise seemed unlikely contenders for democratisation might 
actually be able not only to break free from path-dependent autocratic political 
trajectories, but to do so within a short timeframe by comparison with transitions 
achieved in prior waves. Indeed, there was growing belief that variation in historical 
routes to transition would not prevent the same basic outcome of a consolidated 
democracy across transitioning states (Fishman and Lizardo, 2013). Against the 
backdrop of crumbling communist rule in Eastern Europe, as well as the end of the 
Cold War and the victory of liberal democracy it was quickly thought to imply (see, 
e.g., Fukuyama, 1992), interest and enthusiastic confidence in the transformative 
promise of the third wave spread well beyond the academy, propelling the growth of 
an international ‘democracy promotion’ community (Carothers, 2007).  
Since the late 1990s onwards, however, disparate events have provided 
powerful reminders of the difficulty of consolidating democratic reforms and 
establishing liberal rule in transitioning states. Liberal democratic consolidation has 
proved elusive in the majority of third-wave transitions, with some third-wavers even 
experiencing a return to authoritarian rule (Carothers, 2002). As argued lately by one 
of the ‘fathers’ of transitology, Philippe Schmitter (2014), the ‘dirty secret’ of 
transition studies has been that, although democratic outcomes became more 
frequent over the course of the third wave, they also became less consequential than 
in the past. That is to say, transitions increasingly fulfilled the minimal procedural 
requisites of democracy (i.e., regular, free and fair elections) but not the range of 
other qualitative dimensions that are essential to the functioning of a liberal 
democracy: extensive protections for individual and group freedoms, inclusive 
pluralism in civil society as well as in party politics, civilian control over the military, 
institutions to hold officeholders accountable, and a strong rule of law secured 
through an independent, impartial judiciary.  
The aspirations of transitology and related policy have suffered yet another 
blow in recent years, given political upheavals that the global financial crisis has 
helped spawn in all three Southern European states long described as exemplars of 
the third wave of democratic transition: Greece, Portugal and Spain. Albeit not 
uncontroversially, a variety of macro- and micro-level factors have previously been 
identified as rendering Southern European states more likely to achieve ‘consolidated 
liberal democracy’ than others partaking of the third wave. These factors have most 
notably included rapid economic growth and relative societal affluence by comparison 
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with weak and failing states in the global South, a conducive international 
environment and especially the ‘carrot-and-stick’ approach taken by the European 
Community, and considerable prior experience of party politics (see further 
Diamandouros, 1997; Schmitter, 2014). The severe debt crisis in Southern European 
states as of the late 2000s, however, has called forth a range of domestic and 
international responses that give cause for concern regarding the robustness of 
democracy in these countries.  
Situated in the eye of the financial storm in the Eurozone, debt-ridden states in 
Southern Europe have experienced a dramatic curtailment of their sovereign capacity 
and democratic accountability for domestic policy-making –Greece even came to have 
an unelected technocratic government for a short time– as a result of pressures 
exerted by creditor nations through the European Union, the European Central Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund. Against this background, Greece, Portugal and 
Spain have been downgraded in international rankings of democracy, as compiled by 
non-governmental organisations such as Freedom House and the Economist 
Intelligence Unit; between 2008 and 2011, for example, the Economist Intelligence 
Unit removed Greece and Portugal from its category of ‘full democracies’ (Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 2013; see further Matthijs, 2014; Hare, 2012). With the economic 
downturn having also fuelled political extremism in Southern Europe, further doubt 
has been cast on the ability of Greece, Portugal and Spain to deliver on their liberal 
democratic obligations to uphold civil liberties and the rule of law. Indeed, as 
crystallised in the widely reported comments of European Commission President José 
Manuel Barroso in June 2010, there have been fears that the debt crisis facing Greece, 
Portugal and Spain may be jeopardising no less than the existence of democracy in 
those states. 
If the very notion of the third wave has thus turned out to be somewhat 
illusory, a larger challenge still to the ambitions that surround democratic transition 
has been the onset of what is referred to as a global ‘democratic recession’, whereby 
since the mid-2000s the quality of many democracies around the world has declined 
and the total number of democracies has fallen (Diamond, 1997, 2011; Kurlantzick, 
2013). Compounding this negative trend, questions have also been raised about 
whether or not a liberal democratic telos is realistically attainable for all states 
undergoing transition, given evidence that autocracies around the globe have 
manifested rising levels of resistance to Western-supported democracy-building 
programmes on their soil over the last twenty years or so, but also in light of the 
troubled efforts to enact regime change in Iraq and Afghanistan (Carothers, 2006).  
The achievability of liberal democratic consolidation for transitioning states is 
all the more questionable when one considers that the maintenance of liberal 
government has not always been guaranteed in countries with a sustained history of 
democratic rule (i.e., first-wave democratisers). Indeed, the common assumption that 
liberal democracies do ever reach a final ‘consolidated’ stage has been met with 
growing skepticism amongst students of political systems, although there is little 
consensus as to what lack of consolidation might mean for the fate of a liberal 
democracy. An optimistic view is that the endless, cyclical move of liberal democracies 
from one crisis to another should be taken as evidence of their vitality. Here, in other 
words, flexibility is propounded as an attribute of more or less healthy and certainly 
durable –indeed, ‘consolidated’– liberal democratic states (see further Runciman, 
2013). But there is also a pessimistic, and more convincing, view that even in Western 
Europe liberal democracy has far shallower roots than is commonly construed and 
over recent decades its resilience has been overestimated (Mazower, 1998; see also 
Coggan, 2013).  
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A further problem with the very notion of a ‘consolidated liberal democracy’ is 
mounting evidence that suggests rigid distinctions between democratic and 
authoritarian regimes have been disintegrating in the present era. Rather than 
adopting the typical presumption that ‘consolidated’ democracies and authoritarian 
regimes are by nature diametrically opposed to one another, respectively occupying 
the liberal and illiberal ends of a bipolar continuum, it is increasingly appropriate to 
consider their relationship as one characterised by hybridity. On one hand, as noted 
earlier, there has been a trend over recent decades for authoritarian states to don the 
garb of democracy; by 2001, for instance, ‘electoral authoritarianism’ involving 
pseudo-competitive multi-party elections was twice as prevalent internationally as 
fully closed, ‘exclusionary authoritarianism’ without any pretext of pluralism 
(Brownlee, 2009). On the other hand, and this is a point often lost in pertinent 
scholarship, there has been a rise in authoritarian policies and practices within long-
established democracies. The latter have in recent years been shown not only to rank 
amongst the most punitive nations according to their per capita rates of conventional 
imprisonment, but also to have been making ever greater use of measures more 
commonly associated with authoritarian regimes, from militarised policing and 
intensified mass surveillance, to secret trials and arrests, to indefinite detention (see 
further Hallsworth and Lea, 2011; Graham, 2010; Steinmetz, 2003; Andreas and 
Price, 2001; Wacquant, 2009b).4 
Insofar as consolidation of liberal democracy is an unrealistic aspiration, then 
it is unwise to expect that transition from authoritarian to democratic rule necessarily 
brings in its wake a substantive and durable reduction, if any, in the scope and scale of 
state punitiveness. In other words, achievement of the formal structural requirements 
of liberal democracy should not itself be viewed as a sufficient safeguard against 
punitive legacies of authoritarianism. This underlines the point that typological 
distinctions between political systems can often be inadequate guides to punitive 
policies and practices, and that any analysis of the relationship between political 
systems and state punitiveness needs to be cognisant of the historical and geopolitical 
context upon which this relationship is contingent.  
 
Greece, transition and state punitiveness 
To explore the relationship between political systems and state punitiveness, we take 
a long historical perspective on developments that occurred in Greece during and 
after the dictatorship of 1967-74. Thematically, our overview focuses on civil and 
criminal legislation regarding civil liberties, as well as on policies and practices of 
policing, surveillance and imprisonment. Temporally, we cover four historical 
periods: the decades preceding the country’s dictatorship of 1967-74, starting from 
the 1920s onwards; the dictatorship itself; the seven-year era of conservative-led 
government immediately after the junta’s fall; and the decades since 1981, when 
‘consolidated liberal democracy’ is often thought to have emerged in the country. 
After positioning the 1967-74 dictatorship as the culmination of decades of illiberal 
rule, including under democratic government, we summarise the ‘lenient legacy’ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 There is also some research to suggest that there is convergence towards greater punitiveness 
between long-established and more recently transitioned democracies, and that an important motor 
behind this convergence is the spread of neoliberal socio-economic policies (see, e.g., Godoy, 2005a; 
Beckett and Godoy, 2008; Itturalde, 2008; also Wacquant, 2003). At the same time, contemporary 
authoritarian states have not inevitably manifested the same levels of punitiveness as their 
antecedents; see, e.g., Krastev’s (2011) discussion of the comparison between today’s Russia and its 
Soviet forebear.  
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thesis that concerns the aftermath of the dictatorship, and then proceed to test it with 
reference to the periods 1974-81 and from 1981 onwards.  
Taking a longue durée approach allows us to locate continuities in legal 
restrictions on the provision of civil liberties in the immediate aftermath of the 
dictatorship of 1967-74, but also to chart the intensification of such restrictions since 
the late 2000s through more frequent use of historic legislation, the rescinding of 
protections introduced after the end of the dictatorship, and the launching of new 
measures. We are able to identify the way in which excessive police violence has 
reemerged over recent years, alongside allegations of systematic torture and evidence 
of a close relationship between the police and violent far-right groups. We also note 
continuities in the practice of widespread political surveillance across all different 
timeframes, and track what has been the stark resurgence of the use of imprisonment 
over the last three and a half decades, notwithstanding some important changes to the 
precise forms and targets of custodial punitiveness. 
 
Transition from What? The 1967-74 Dictatorship and its Antecedents  
During the anti-communist military dictatorship of 1967-74, political parties were 
banned, trade unions and labour strikes were outlawed, and press censorship was 
tight, whilst other civil liberties were rescinded (Hadjiyannis, 1990). The use of 
torture by the state against resisters was routine and formalised through training and 
instruction of personnel in the security and military police forces (Becket, 1970; 
Haritos-Fatouros, 2003). Surveillance measures were comprehensive against both 
leftists and suspected sympathisers, drawing, amongst others, on networks of civilian 
informants and overt monitoring by the police (Samatas, 2004). Some 10,000 leftists 
were banished to islands, and many more were subjected to short and violent 
detention aimed at extracting information about resistance activities and deterring 
the general population from political engagement (Voglis, 2002; Diamandouros 
1995).  
The widespread employment of surveillance, detention and internal exile by 
police and military authorities during the junta goes a long way towards explaining 
why the otherwise extensive use of conventional imprisonment over the same period 
did not generally reach the levels known for the post-Civil War era (see Figure 1), even 
though police-recorded rates of common crime were significantly higher during the 
junta by comparison with earlier years. To the extent, in other words, that 
conventional imprisonment was employed by the junta for the purposes of 
suppressing political dissidence, it formed part of a broad panoply of measures meant 
to sustain and strengthen the regime’s reign of terror.  
The average annual caseload of convicted and remand prisoners during the 
dictatorship stood at 16,408, or 185 per 100,000 inhabitants.5 Although these figures 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Throughout this article, our reporting and discussion of imprisonment trends in Greece draws 
predominantly on our compilation and analysis of primary data published by the National Statistical 
Service of Greece (NSSG), focusing in particular on annual caseloads of prisoners and annual totals of 
admissions to the prison. At the time of writing, the years for which data on imprisonment have been 
made available by NSSG do not go beyond 2008, hence we also make brief reference later in the article 
to one-day snapshots of the prison population, which are published by the Ministry of Justice, 
Transparency and Human Rights, and have been made available for more recent years, but only up to 
2012. Pertinent literature on Greece typically relies on one-day snapshots alone (at times also on rather 
irregular snapshots), to the exclusion of annual caseloads of prisoners and annual totals of admissions 
to the prison. Evidently, this leaves one in the dark as to the number of offenders held in custody over 
the course of a year, the number of offenders sent to prison by the courts over that year, and the length 
of their stay in prison, thereby ultimately understating the overall scale and severity of imprisonment 
(see further Cheliotis, 2011).   
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are not inclusive of the mass of people subjected to detention or exile by the police or 
military authorities, they still incorporate political prisoners held in conventional 
prisons. The data available do not allow for specifying the size of this population, but 
it is clear that criminal courts made extensive use of custodial sentences for 
defendants charged with offences of a political nature, if not formally prescribed as 
such (e.g., public order offences and offences against state authority) (see, e.g., Voglis, 
2002). It is also known that political dissidents were often detained in conventional 
prisons on charges of violation of common criminal laws. 
Whether as a tool of stifling political opposition or as a means of dealing with 
common crime, custodial punishment during the dictatorship mainly assumed the 
form of either remand imprisonment or imprisonment under sentence for short 
periods. Expressed as the combined annual caseload of convicted and remand 
prisoners, the use of custodial punishment underwent a particularly impressive rise 
during 1967, the first year that the Colonels’ regime was in power, rising by 20.7 
percent by comparison with 1966. This upward trend was especially pronounced in 
the caseload of remand prisoners, which rose by a spectacular 52.7 percent between 
1966 and 1967, thereby also reaching a rate of 161 per 100,000 inhabitants–what is 
still to date the highest rate to have been recorded since the post-Civil War era (see 
Figure 1).  
In the remaining years of the dictatorship, imprisonment under sentence 
retained greater vigor than remand imprisonment. The caseload of convicted 
prisoners reached its peak (14,687, or 165 per 100,000 inhabitants) in 1972, just 
before the Colonels sought to manage public opposition to the regime by engaging in a 
short-lived experiment of ‘controlled liberalisation’ (Kornetis, 2013), during which the 
caseload of convicted prisoners returned to levels recorded for the immediate pre-
junta years (see Figure 1). The average annual caseload of convicted prisoners during 
the dictatorship as a whole stood at 13,073, or 148 per 100,000 inhabitants, the 
overwhelming majority of whom were sentenced for terms up to a year (see Figure 1), 
yet admissions to the prison system under sentence were counterbalanced by the 
respective levels of prison releases, especially in the twilight years of the dictatorship.  
 
Insert Figure 1 here  
 
The dictatorship of ’67 hardly represented rupture from the general mode of 
government with which the country was familiar, despite long traditions of 
constitutional rule and competitive multi-party politics. Not only was there already a 
clear pattern of military interventionism in political life, discrimination and 
repression against leftists had also been entrenched state practice, carried out in 
collaboration with so-called ‘parastate’ adjuncts (i.e., groups covertly meting out 
intimidation and violence against leftists, often in concert with the police or the 
military, and with tacit protection from the state) (Mazower, 1997).  
Over the course of the twentieth century, prior to the military junta of 1967-74, 
Greece had experienced Civil War (1944-49), multiple coups d’état, and many decades 
of illiberal rule, including periods of dictatorship (between 1925-26 under General 
Pangalos, and between 1936-41 under former-General Ioannis Metaxas). Thousands 
of leftists were exiled and imprisoned on islands around Greece under Metaxas’ 
dictatorship, mostly without trial (see further Mazower, 1991, 1997; Seferiades, 2005). 
Similarly, the year 1945 saw an approximate 10,000 leftists sent to prison during what 
is known as the ‘White Terror’ (Voglis, 2002: 57). Furthermore, according to Voglis, 
‘[a]t any given moment from 1947 to 1949, between 40,000 and 50,000 individuals 
were interned in prisons and camps’ because of their leftist beliefs (ibid.: 63). 
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Emergency anti-communist legislation that originated during the Civil War was only 
formally abolished in 1962, whereupon it was replaced in some cases by even harsher 
reformulations of common law; indeed, up until the dictatorship of 1967, individuals 
were still being detained, stripped of their citizenship and having their property seized 
by dint of their communist affiliations, real or invented (Samatas, 2004). What is 
more, Civil War-era anti-communist legal provisions were all too quickly revived by 
the junta of 1967 (Stefatos, 2012).  
Trends in the use of conventional imprisonment also testify to the spread and 
intensity of state punitiveness in Greece prior to the dictatorship of 1967, again 
mainly in the form of either remand imprisonment or imprisonment under sentence 
for short periods. Between 1929 and 1937, for example, imprisonment rates stood at 
levels that still remain by far the highest to have been recorded in Greek penal history. 
During this period, the annual caseload of convicted and remand prisoners reached 
an average of 41,585, or 626 per 100,000 inhabitants, as a result of a 32.7 percent 
increase in the annual caseload of convicted prisoners, which itself amounted to 
33,200, or 499 per 100,000 inhabitants, on the average. The vast majority of 
custodial sentences were short (not beyond a year, and usually up to three months), 
whilst there is evidence to suggest that at least part of the prison population in 1936-
1937 consisted of political detainees, whether serving a prescribed portion of their 
sentence in the ‘main’ prison system, or awaiting deportation to an island of internal 
exile, or under conviction for violations of common criminal laws (see, e.g., Kenna, 
2001; Voglis, 2002; Seferiades, 2005). In the post-Civil War era, despite an overall 
drop in the use of custodial sentences, imprisonment still affected a very significant 
segment of the population (e.g., the average caseload of convicted and remand 
prisoners stood at 19,154, or 232 per 100,000 inhabitants, between 1956 and 1966), 
increasingly so in the form of remand imprisonment (see Figure 1).  
That such longstanding policies and practices would subside after the end of 
the dictatorship of 1967-1974 was far from inevitable. This was all the more so given 
the manner in which the Colonels’ dictatorship gave way to democratic transition. 
Although the dictatorship had not come to power on the back of mass support, nor 
did it succeed in cultivating such support whilst in power, it faced relatively weak 
resistance to its rule, notwithstanding an ill-fated and now iconic student uprising at 
the Polytechnic School in Athens in November 1973. Indeed, the junta was not 
toppled by any spectacular manifestation of popular will, but rather collapsed, as 
historian Richard Clogg (1986) has put it, under the weight of its own manifest 
incompetence, following a humiliating conclusion to the military government’s 
adventurism in Cyprus.6 Subsequent to that humiliation, the reins of government 
were handed back to civilian control by the junta’s military leaders themselves.  
 
Regime Change as Rupture: The ‘Lenient Legacy’ Thesis 
Prominent scholarship on democratic transition in Southern Europe has argued that 
regime change in the region was marked by civilian governments that aimed to deal 
with the legacies of dictatorial repression as ‘a major policy consideration of 
paramount importance’. This zeal, it has been argued further, ‘made possible the 
effective restraining of the coercive impulses of the police and ensured that judiciaries 
would strictly adhere to the rule of law and to the norms concerning the defence of 
civil and political liberties associated with democratic politics’ (Diamandouros et al., 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Under the junta, Greece stimulated in Cyprus a coup d’état, which, in its turn, incited the island’s 
invasion by Turkey. Given the junta’s nationalistic raison d’être, the Colonels were compelled to accept 
responsibility for this failure of judgment and to return government to civilian control (see further 
Clogg, 1986). 
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2006: 25). In the particular case of Greece, the argument has been taken to the 
extreme. Despite –or, indeed, because of– the considerable historical legacy the 
country needed to overcome, its democratic transition, also known as the 
metapolitefsi, is widely thought to have brought about such a radical and conclusive 
transformation of the tenor of political life that it instigated an excessively liberal, 
post-punitive era. According to this line of interpretation, the experience of 
dictatorship ‘inoculated’ Greek public opinion against the appeal of ‘authoritarian 
solutions’, albeit at the cost of generating a gloss of democratic legitimation for all 
manifestations of anti-state lawlessness, in the face of which civilian governments 
‘utterly failed to redress the balance in favour of the law and order required by a 
democracy’ (Mavrogordatos, 2009: 971). 
Thus, for example, what are described as routine performances of lawlessness 
amongst the country’s youth are regularly blamed on a national culture that glorifies 
resistance against the state; a culture borne of the dominant left-wing ideology that 
the metapolitefsi reputedly ushered in (see, e.g., Andronikidou and Kovras, 2012; 
Mavrogordatos, 2009). This celebration of anti-state activities is itself supposedly 
underpinned by public sentiments of deep mistrust towards the Greek police and 
security forces. Indeed, it has become a truism to assert that after the end of junta’s 
rule the police and security forces were discredited in the eyes of the public ‘for being 
organs of violence and oppression rather than institutions for maintaining public 
order, as well as for their role in the junta period in violating human rights and 
restricting any freedom of expression’ (Katsikas, 2014: 285-6). 
In addition to encouraging lawlessness as such, sentiments of mistrust towards 
the police and security sectors are also said to have undermined the state’s power to 
maintain social order, insofar as political elites in office have found it expedient to 
pander to the public through ensuring that lawlessness is dealt with leniently by the 
criminal justice system. In this vein, accusations have been raised against 
governments for tying the hands of the police, rendering them too timid to intervene 
decisively during riots and disorderly demonstrations. Similarly, governments have 
found themselves under fire for undercutting the work of the judiciary by purportedly 
intervening to hinder prosecution in cases involving politically sensitive charges, such 
as those of participation in student occupations and public disorder.  
 
1974-1981 
The year 1974 may rightly be judged to have been a turning point at which support for 
democracy over dictatorship was accepted conclusively across the majority of the 
political spectrum in Greece and the military returned to their barracks, henceforth 
effectively prevented from resuming an interventionist role in political life. There is 
little evidence, however, that this historical juncture, or indeed the ensuing years of 
the metapolitefsi, delivered an unequivocal abandonment of the illiberal norms and 
modes of governance that obtained both during the dictatorship and long before it.  
The first seven years after the junta saw stilted efforts, limited both in terms of 
scope and intensity, to redress the injustices and abuses of past illiberal rule and 
instigate and embed liberal democratic norms, policies and practices. As soon as 
civilian rule was reinstated in July 1974, the new rightist interim government led by 
Constantine Karamanlis introduced a set of liberalisation measures, most notably the 
decriminalisation of communist parties that had been outlawed in the country since 
1947 (Seferiades, 1986). Other measures in this vein included the closure of the worst 
prison camps, the release of all remaining political prisoners, the pardoning of 
political crimes committed against the junta, the restoration of citizenship to all 
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opponents of the dictatorship, and the removal of orders denying or limiting the right 
of individuals to travel abroad (Katsikas, 2014; Clogg, 1986). 
Liberalisation, however, was not to be pursued much further. To begin with, 
although the leaders of the junta were arrested and an official enquiry was launched 
into the brutal crushing of the Polytechnic uprising, these developments did not occur 
until October 1975, over a year after the junta stepped down and no less than eleven 
months following completion of the first post-dictatorship national elections that 
brought the conservative New Democracy party to office under Karamanlis’ 
premiership. Most crucially, the government was essentially forced into action by a 
private citizen, the attorney Alexandros Lykourezos, who took it upon himself to 
instigate legal proceedings against junta leaders, at a time when Karamanlis’ own 
inaction was receiving intensifying criticism by the centre-left parliamentary 
opposition. 
Continuities in criminal justice provision also began manifesting themselves at 
that stage. For example, the decision to send junta leaders into exile on the island of 
Tzia immediately after their arrest drew upon long-standing anti-communist 
legislation (Sotiropoulos, 2007). Whilst, moreover, the eventual successful 
prosecution of the junta protagonists has been hailed as a cathartic moment in Greek 
political life, the exceptionally lenient treatment that they subsequently received in 
prison, including access to such perks as air conditioning, television sets and tennis 
courts, suggests there were significant lingering sympathies for the prior regime (see 
further Katsikas, 2014). 
The broader ‘dejuntification’ of the military, but also of the police, security and 
judicial sectors, was similarly plagued by the tame lustration processes that were 
initiated in 1974 under the interim civilian government. No more than 11 military 
generals were retired, whilst a range of middle- and lower-ranking officers were 
merely placed on temporary suspension. A number of police and security officers 
known to have tortured opponents of the junta were meanwhile only reassigned to 
different posts or temporarily suspended from duties. Out of an estimated total of 92 
cases of police and security officers who were purged through removal from post and 
prosecution, just over half (57 percent) led to a conviction, with most sentences either 
being suspended or converted to a fine, including for two infamous torturers. 
Indicative of state reticence over lustration is the fact that prosecutions for torture 
and human rights abuses against more than one thousand victims were triggered 
almost exclusively by private citizens. What is more, a law passed in 1976 imposed 
time limits on the filing of civil suits, thereby paving the way to two-thirds of the 
lawsuits brought by private citizens –the majority of all such cases filed– being 
dismissed. As regards the judiciary, only 23 high-ranking judges were charged with 
disciplinary offences following the fall of the junta. Of them, 5 were absolved, the 
vetting process was cancelled for another 6, and the remaining 12 received mild 
sanctions, ranging from cancellation of their promotion, to temporary suspension 
from duties, to forced retirement (Sotiropoulos, 2007).  
During the first seven years of the metapolitefsi, furthermore, there was no 
effort to subject either the police and security services or the judiciary to reforms 
reflective of a new, liberal democratic environment, despite the fact that each had 
historically excluded leftists and had been instrumental in building an anti-
communist state in the post-Civil War era (Magalhães et al., 2006). There is a view 
that the pivotal role played by judges in processing a range of cases under the rubric 
of transitional justice helped to establish the judiciary’s democratic credentials after 
the end of the dictatorship (see, e.g., Alivizatos and Diamandouros, 1997). Although 
the police and security services cannot be argued to have engaged in any such 
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cathartic process, they retained autonomy from parliamentary oversight and their 
institutionalised values and practices were left unchallenged.  
Whilst there appear to have been no reported cases of torture by the police in 
the immediate aftermath of the dictatorship, excessive and even fatal violence 
continued to be practised during the policing of public protests between 1975 and 
1981 (Eleftherotypia, 1996). At the same time, although the conservative government 
of New Democracy repeatedly refused to admit to the existence of a mass system of 
intelligence filing on Greek citizens, the state’s police and security apparatus did not 
actually cease compiling and updating records on the ideological affiliations and 
political activities of citizens. Indeed, multiple files were held on vast numbers of 
individuals; by 1981, there were 41.2 million files in a country whose population 
comprised just 9.5 million inhabitants. Of those files, 25.5 million contained purely 
politico-ideological intelligence, including information gathered between 1974 and 
1981 on individuals suspected of sympathising with the then principal party of 
opposition, the left-wing PASOK, and thus recorded as holding ‘semi-extreme’ 
political positions that signaled an insufficient commitment to the country’s 
‘democratic system’ (see further Samatas, 1986, 2004).  
 Turning to conventional imprisonment, despite a significant drop in the use of 
imprisonment as a whole, there was a rise with regard to remand imprisonment and, 
for the first time, imprisonment under long-term sentences. Between 1974 and 1981, 
the combined annual caseload of convicted and remand prisoners fell by 29.2 percent, 
from 14,754, or 163 per 100,000 inhabitants, to 10,306, or 106 per 100,000 
inhabitants–a historic low according to official records (see Figure 1). This downward 
trend was largely confined, however, to the beginning and end of the seven-year 
period, with slight fluctuations in the intervening years. The total caseload of 
convicted and remand prisoners dropped by 16.5 percent between 1974 and 1975, and 
by 10 percent between 1980 and 1981, during the build-up to the elections that 
brought left-wing PASOK to government with a landslide victory. The overall drop in 
the combined annual caseload of convicted and remand prisoners between 1974 and 
1981 was due to a significant 39.6 percent decline in the caseload of convicted 
prisoners in particular, from 11,925 (133 per 100,000 inhabitants) to 7,200 (74 per 
100,000). Yet once again, the fall was inconsistent and most pronounced at the 
beginning and end of the period in question, amounting to 19 percent between 1974 
and 1975, and to 12 percent between 1980 and 1981.  
In any case, the fall in the annual caseload of convicted prisoners was 
overwhelmingly restricted to the caseload of prisoners serving short sentences, with 
the caseload of prisoners serving long terms remaining more or less stable. Whereas 
the caseload of prisoners sentenced up to a year declined by an impressive 54.8 
percent between 1974 and 1981, the caseload of prisoners sentenced to a year or more 
only fell by 1.9 percent during the same timeframe, given that the flow of such cases 
into the prison system remained remarkably stable and at levels that practically offset 
the effect of releases from prison. Indeed, the annual average of 1,323 admissions to 
sentenced custody for terms of a year or more between 1974 and 1981 exceeded both 
the respective average of 1,285 admissions during the Colonels’ dictatorship and even 
more so the levels recorded for the post-Civil War era. Perhaps more strikingly, 
however, the annual caseload of prisoners under remand underwent a significant 17.2 
percent rise between 1974 and 1981, from 2,649 (or 30 per 100,000) to 3,106 (or 32 
per 100,000), thereby gradually exceeding the caseload of remand prisoners recorded 
for most years of the junta (as well as reaching the highest share –30.1 percent– in the 
combined annual caseload of convicted and remand prisoners ever recorded in Greece 
up to that point) (see Figure 1).  
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All in all, it appears that the sensitivity of the political environment, combined 
with limited lustration processes that left a punitive judiciary in place, restricted (and, 
at least in the cases of long-term and remand imprisonment, arguably prohibited) 
liberalisation in the use of conventional imprisonment in the immediate years after 
the junta’s fall. Although common crime increased during this period, it is unclear 
whether the levels it reached and the patterns it displayed (i.e., trends in particular 
types of crime) suffice to justify the rise observed in the use of longer custodial 
sentences and remand imprisonment over the same timeframe. It could be instead 
that increases in crime incited or exacerbated fears of victimisation and other, socio-
economic anxieties amongst the public, thereby helping to shape the backdrop against 
which continuities in state punitiveness became possible in the aftermath of the junta.  
Given that public opinion surveys of the period did not specifically contain 
questions about the police or the judiciary, the extent to which the absence of reform 
in either institution after the end of the dictatorship caused them to be delegitimised 
in the eyes of the public is not self-evident. What is clear, however, is that the 
preponderance of the citizenry supported or otherwise condoned the restraint shown 
by conservative government elites in enforcing the ‘dejuntification’ of the state 
apparatus as a whole. Indeed, despite assumptions that the electorate had been 
radicalised by the experience of the junta and that subsequent electoral contests 
would therefore show a conclusive swing to the Left, Karamanlis’ New Democracy 
won one of the largest majorities in Greek political history in the election held four 
months after the end of the dictatorship, attracting 54 percent of the vote and 
securing 220 out of 300 seats in parliament as a result. Neither the appointment of 
Cabinet ministers tainted by association with fascism nor the anti-communist 
prescriptions in the Constitution passed in 1975 (e.g., national loyalty requirements of 
civil servants that practically excluded communists from public employment; see 
further Samatas, 1986, 2004) prevented New Democracy from achieving reelection 
with a comfortable parliamentary majority in the general elections of 1977, when the 
combined vote of right-wing parties also demonstrated a significant lead ahead of the 
combined left-wing vote (the former’s share amounting to 50 percent, and the latter’s 
to 37 percent; see further Clogg, 1986). If anything, there was little to substantiate the 
claim that the Right and its authoritarian aura had been decisively rejected by most 
citizens in the first few years after the dictatorship.  
 
1981-20127 
The arrival in office of the left-wing PASOK government following the elections of 
1981 is often thought to have inaugurated the ‘consolidated’ phase of liberal 
democracy in Greece. PASOK’s rule between 1981 and 1989 marks the point at which 
official efforts to confront the legacy of authoritarianism in the country not only 
targeted the attitudes, policies and practices embodied by the dictatorship of 1967-74, 
but were extended to address illiberalism over the post-Civil War era in its entirety. 
Just as, for example, pension rights were restored in 1985 to civil servants who had 
been dismissed during the junta for political reasons, so too in 1989 criminal 
convictions were annulled for offences relating either to participation in the Civil War 
on the side of the Left or to leftist anti-state activities between the end of the Civil War 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 There are two main reasons why our periodisation for this section extends to 2012 and not beyond: 
first, because more recent official data on imprisonment, one of our key indicators of state 
punitiveness, have yet to be made available at the time of writing; and second, because 2012 is the year 
that saw the collapse of the two-party system that developed in the wake of the dictatorship, a 
convulsion that has led some commentators to diagnose the (unsuccessful) conclusion of the 
metapolitefsi era (see, e.g., Pappas, 2014). 
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and the fall of the dictatorship in July 1974 (Katsikas, 2014). In several other 
important respects, however, illiberalism either saw a resurgence or continued 
without interruption and even intensified. 
Civil liberties themselves have suffered considerable downgrading following 
the onset of the country’s financial crisis in the late 2000s. From 2011 onwards, for 
instance, legislation providing for civil mobilisation in times of peacetime emergency 
has been used by centrist governments with a frequency unprecedented since the 
beginning of the metapolitefsi to force striking workers –or even those planning to 
strike– to continue working, threatening non-compliance with penalties stretching to 
a five-year prison sentence. Over the same period, governments have repeatedly 
limited the right to public assembly, evoking a legal provision of the junta era 
(Legislative Decree 794/1971) to prevent public demonstrations taking place against 
foreign dignitaries and Eurogroup meetings (Kaltsouni and Kosma, 2015). Legislation 
identified with the ‘excessive leniency’ of the metapolitefsi has also been withdrawn: 
Law 1268/1982, which barred police from entering university campuses without the 
permission of the Rector, thereby giving protesting students sanctuary from arrest 
and prosecution, was abolished in 2011. Pointedly, the first use of these new police 
powers was authorised by the technocratic government of prime minister Lucas 
Papademos in November 2011.  
As regards the police, reforms have been very moderate. With the proclaimed 
goal of strengthening the democratic accountability of the police, tackling its illiberal 
ethos and practices, and improving its effectiveness in crime control, the Hellenic 
Police was established in 1984 under the auspices of the Ministry of Public Order. The 
new force replaced and absorbed the personnel of the Chorofylake (National 
Gendarmerie) and the Astynomia Poleon (City Police), which had been under the 
control of the military. The 1984 reform produced a certain degree of liberalisation 
through such measures as revoking the ban on police marrying individuals with a 
communist background, and ceasing to require police to secure permission in order to 
marry a foreigner. Yet as concerns the demilitarisation of the police, although 
pronounced as a government policy at the time, it was conceived in the narrow terms 
of shifting ministerial responsibilities, as a consequence of which the internal 
hierarchical structure and disciplinary code of the Hellenic Police retained a 
militaristic character (Mazower, 1997).  
The continuing militaristic character of the police has since been manifest both 
in its strategies and tactics, in light of which the force has maintained a reputation for 
repression and brutality. The cumulative effect of reforms introduced over recent 
decades by centre-left and centre-right governments to strengthen counter-terrorism 
capabilities and demonstrate control of common crime and mass immigration has 
been to exacerbate punitive policing against a broad variety of targets. From mass 
preventative detentions in advance of planned public protests to so-called ‘sweep’ 
operations to capture and deport irregular immigrants, and from speculative raids on 
Roma communities to the deployment of militarised units to intervene against urban 
disorder, police intimidation and excessive violence has reportedly seen a significant 
increase since the early 2000s (see further Amnesty International, 2012, 2014; Basille 
and Kourounis, 2011; Xenakis and Cheliotis, 2013).8  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 As regards trends in excessive police violence, it is difficult to ascertain the extent to which 
contemporary records testify to a rise in such abuse over recent years or represent continuity with the 
early years of the metapolitefsi, given the lack of scholarship and systematic media or NGO reporting of 
the issue during that period. Nevertheless, and notwithstanding significant police repression of 
protests between 1975 and 1981, the first sustained rise in the excessive use of force by the police in the 
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Furthermore, whilst there has been no evidence of a return to the 
institutionalised torture practices of the dictatorship, by the 2000s the use of torture 
by the Greek police was being characterised as ‘widespread and systematic’, 
particularly against immigrants, as well as leftists and anarchists (Amnesty 
International, 2014). In tandem, Greek state authorities have been accused of treating 
the phenomenon with impunity, including by failing to redress weaknesses both in 
the legal prohibition of torture and the implementation of pertinent legislation. In 
particular, there has been no move to remedy the over-restrictive definition of torture 
in the Greek penal code so that it meets international standards, nor any apparent 
challenge made to the judiciary’s marked reluctance to use torture as grounds for 
prosecution (ibid.). 
Since the 1990s, there have also been numerous allegations of police collusion 
with far-right intimidation and violence, which have provoked concerns amongst 
some leftist constituencies about the persistence of the parastate. According to a 
confidential police document dated 10 December 1999 and publicised by the 
broadsheet newspaper Ta Nea in 2004, for example, the Hellenic Police had been 
providing members of the neo-fascistic far-right party Chrysi Avyi (Golden Dawn) 
with walkie talkies and batons as aids to violence against students, leftists and 
anarchists at successive demonstrations (Christopoulos, 2014; Psarras, 2012).9 Over 
the last ten years or so, moreover, there have been instances captured on film and 
aired in public where far-rightists have engaged in violence from behind and amongst 
police lines against protesting leftists and anarchists, and where they have attacked 
immigrants and journalists in front of passive onlooking police officers (Xenakis, 
2012; Amnesty International, 2014).  
Following the murder of a Greek anti-fascist musician by a member of Chrysi 
Avyi in September 2013, public concerns about police collusion in far-right violence 
led the government to launch an unprecedented nationwide investigation into the 
issue. Yet the investigation, undertaken by the Internal Affairs Directorate of the 
Hellenic Police itself, concluded in just one month with the announcement that a 
mere ten officers in total had been found to have direct or indirect links with the 
criminal activities meanwhile attributed by prosecutors to members or 
parliamentarians of Chrysi Avyi. No comment was forthcoming about the suggestion 
previously made by the Minister of Public Order and Citizen Protection that some 
units had gone so far as set up far-right cells within the force  (Christopoulos, 2014; 
Amnesty International, 2014).  
In dominant political discourse, police collusion with the far-right has typically 
been framed as a problem stemming from the culture, or sub-cultures, of the police 
itself. Politicians, however, have played a key role in constructing a conducive 
environment for the phenomenon to emerge and develop, whether by increasingly 
resorting to racist and politically divisive language and policies, or by denying or 
downplaying police misconduct as such (Amnesty International, 2012, 2014). The 
extent to which the political establishment has informally endorsed the parastate after 
1974 is perhaps best captured by the point, contained in the secret police report from 
1999 mentioned above, that centre-right parliamentarians have even directly 
furnished members of Chrysi Avyi with guns (Psarras, 2012).  
Political commitment to tackling political surveillance has also proved half-
hearted. Whilst in opposition, PASOK had been highly critical of political surveillance 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
post-junta period is thought to have emerged from the mid-1980s onwards (Christopoulos, 2014; 
Psarras, 2012). 
9 The Golden Dawn organisation was established in 1985, but registered as a political party only in 1993 
(see further Xenakis, 2012). 
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by the state, yet it was only several years after the party came to power, and following 
media revelations in 1984 that the Greek intelligence service was still collecting 
information on the political activities of leftists, that the maintenance of state 
surveillance and its scale were officially acknowledged. Indeed, despite issuing a 
promise henceforth that the vast number of political surveillance files would be 
destroyed, the PASOK government failed to do so, and instead secretly ordered in 
1985 that such files be preserved for continued use. It was not until 1989, under the 
coalition government of New Democracy and the Communist Party (KKE), that 
political surveillance files were eventually destroyed by the state, but then again, the 
measure was only applied to 16.5 million files of the 41.2 million previously 
acknowledged to exist. Moreover, as brought to light by successive phone-tapping 
scandals in the 1980s and 1990s, both PASOK and New Democracy governments 
presided over the expansion of official surveillance targets to include not only 
members of all opposition parties but also internal challengers to party leaders 
(Samatas, 2004). 
Trends in the use of imprisonment from the 1980s onwards cast further 
serious doubt on the validity of the assertion that Greece’s dictatorship left a legacy of 
lenience behind it, even if the expressions and targets of custodial punitiveness have 
undergone some important changes in recent decades. Between 1982 and 1989, whilst 
PASOK was in government, and despite remarkably stable crime rates, the annual 
total caseload of convicted and remand prisoners increased by 12 percent, from 9,602 
(or 98 per 100,000 inhabitants) to 10,763 (or 107 per 100,000 inhabitants). This was 
primarily due to a 26 percent rise in the caseload of remand prisoners, from 3,185 (or 
33 per 100,000) to 4,015 (or 40 per 100,000), with the proportion of remand 
prisoners amongst the total prisoner caseload also rising, from 33.1 percent to 37.3 
percent.  
The caseload of convicted prisoners also rose over the same period, if by a 
comparatively modest 5 percent, despite a decline in the rate of admissions to 
sentenced custody. This was partly due a decline in the annual rate of releases from 
prison, but mainly due to a 30.6 percent rise in the caseload of prisoners sentenced to 
a year or more, with the largest expansion, at a rate of 75.8 percent, recorded for 
prisoners sentenced to a term of five to twenty years (see Figure 1). Not, then, that the 
judiciary was more liberal in their use of custodial sentences during the 1980s, but 
their traditionally punitive mentality manifested itself in the expanding use of long 
custodial sentences, more so than in the use of custodial sentences as such (see 
further Cheliotis, 2010; Cheliotis and Xenakis, 2010). 
As of 1990 onwards, despite only a modest rise in crime rates (see, e.g., 
Cheliotis and Xenakis, 2011), the use of imprisonment has grown rapidly, albeit no 
longer so much in the form of remand imprisonment, but mainly in the form of 
imprisonment under sentence and for ever longer periods at that. Between 1990 and 
2008, for example, the annual caseload of convicted and remand prisoners grew by 
68.6 percent, from 11,835 (or 115 per 100,000) to 19,963 (or 178 per 100,000). The 
caseload of remand prisoners increased by 15.1 percent over the same period, yet the 
caseload of convicted prisoners grew by an astonishing 98.6 percent.  
The rise was even more dramatic in the case of imprisonment under conviction 
for long terms: the annual caseload of prisoners sentenced to a year or more rose by 
130 percent, with the largest expansions recorded for prisoners sentenced to terms of 
five to twenty years (by 389 percent, from 1,246 to 6,093), three to five years (by 361.5 
percent, from 616 to 2,843), and life imprisonment (by 236.2 percent, from 270 to 
908). Indeed, the caseload of prisoners sentenced to a year or more grew to reach 
historic highs in the late 2000s, overtaking even the officially recorded levels of 
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interwar years (e.g., 107 per 100,000 in 2008 as compared to 100 in 1937) (see Figure 
1).  
If the use of ever-longer custodial sentences gathered momentum during the 
late 1970s and 1980s before exploding thereafter, the 1990s saw an unexpected –and 
unprecedented– change in the ethnoracial composition of the prison population in 
Greece. Amidst a climate of growing xenophobia amongst the public, Greek prisons 
started filling with foreigners. Between 1996, when official data collection began on 
the nationality of convicted prisoners, and 2006, the annual total caseload of non-
Greek convicts rose by 140.5 percent, from 2,253 (or 404 per 100,000 non-Greek 
inhabitants) to 5,420 (or 559 per 100,000 non-Greek inhabitants). Correspondingly, 
the proportion of non-Greeks amongst the total caseload of convicts increased from 
25.3 percent to 41.1 percent–four times higher than the estimated share of non-
Greeks in the general population of the country. In more recent years, according to 
official one-day snapshots of the prison population, non-Greeks have far 
outnumbered Greeks in the prison population of the country (e.g., constituting 63.2 
percent of the total at the beginning of 2012).  
The level and nature of criminal involvement by non-Greeks, however, leave 
much unanswered as to the driving forces behind their overrepresentation in the total 
caseload of convicted prisoners. As we have shown elsewhere, holding crime constant, 
non-Greeks are roughly eight times more likely to be sentenced to imprisonment than 
Greeks, as a consequence of a series of biases against them in the country’s criminal 
justice system, including ethno-racial prejudices in the sentencing behaviour of judges 
(see, further, Cheliotis and Xenakis, 2011; Xenakis and Cheliotis, 2013).  
 
Conclusion 
In a narrow sense, this article contributes a corrective account of state punitiveness in 
the specific context of post-dictatorial Greece. More broadly, the article provides 
additional empirical support to the growing body of scholarship that has sought to 
highlight continuities in state punitiveness before, during and after transition to 
democracy. Unlike previous work, however, the article also foregrounds the complex 
implications such continuities bear for the relationship between state punitiveness 
and political systems.  
Our findings emphatically disprove the thesis popularly propounded in Greece 
that the legacy of the country’s military dictatorship of 1967-74 has been decade after 
decade of excessive leniency in the field of law and order. In terms of institutional and 
normative change, Greece has not been amongst the least successful states to have 
undergone transition to democracy since the 1970s. Our analysis of post-dictatorship 
trends in state punitiveness, however, suggests that the country’s liberal democratic 
credentials have been more limited and vulnerable to regression than expected and 
commonly assumed. Taking a broad approach to state punitiveness allows us to 
identify a striking set of continuities and recurring motifs in punitive state policies 
and practices before, during and after the dictatorship: from legal provisions that 
have been used to subvert civil rights of protest, assembly, expression and political 
conviction, to excessive police violence and custodial punishment against out-groups, 
to mutually convenient relations between the state and far-right groups engaging in 
illicit violence, to the intimidatory surveillance of alleged subversives. 
As concerns the impact that transition from authoritarian to democratic rule 
has upon state punitiveness, our study confirms previous research on other 
jurisdictions, showing that regime change does not guarantee a transformation of 
punitive state policies and practices. In particular, our evidence challenges the views 
that prior experience of authoritarianism is protective against authoritarianism in the 
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future, and that liberalisation in the field of criminal justice follows from the 
commitment provided to civil liberties after the establishment of democracy. Indeed, 
what we find is that the legacy of authoritarianism may well be more 
authoritarianism. 
To pinpoint the persisting influence of an authoritarian past is by no means to 
imply that continuities in state punitiveness before, during and after transition to 
democracy can be attributed to authoritarian legacies alone. In the Greek case, for 
example, the modest nature of lustration in political life and the public sector may not 
suffice to account for the durability and expansion of state punitiveness beyond the 
early years of democratic transition. Although a thorough analysis of factors 
determining the manifestation and influence of Greece’s authoritarian legacy has yet 
to be undertaken, key amongst these factors are likely to be politico-economic 
pressures, whose importance in shaping the use of imprisonment and cognate policies 
in the country over recent decades has been identified in previous research (see 
further Cheliotis and Xenakis, 2010, 2011; Cheliotis, 2013; Xenakis and Cheliotis, 
2013, 2015). 
At the same time, our study illustrates that the lasting manifestation of an 
authoritarian legacy does not preclude new targets for state punitiveness under the 
emergent democratic rule. Whilst we trace significant continuities in levels of state 
punitiveness in Greece over time, we also find that the profile of those subject to 
punitive state policies and practices changed dramatically after the end of the 
dictatorship. For most of the twentieth century, the Greek state and its criminal 
justice system in particular prioritised the repression of leftists. It is not possible to 
assess the precise proportion ‘political criminals’ have constituted of the total 
caseloads of arrested, prosecuted, convicted and imprisoned individuals, given that 
those stigmatised for their leftist political beliefs have been over-represented in 
common crime categories as a result of prejudice against them at each of the stages of 
reporting, policing and sentencing of crime. It is nevertheless clear that the post-
dictatorship era saw foreigners and immigrants become the overwhelming target of 
state punitiveness, as testified by the disproportionate preponderance of ethnoracial 
minorities in police, judicial and prison statistics (see, further, Cheliotis and Xenakis, 
2011; Xenakis and Cheliotis, 2013). 
Turning, finally, to our study’s broader concern with the relationship between 
state punitiveness and political systems, our findings suggest that the former does not 
necessarily vary across the latter. In particular, our analysis of democratic transition 
in the particular context of Greece yields little evidence in support of the standard 
criminological expectation of higher levels and harsher patterns of punitiveness in 
non-democratic states by comparison with their democratic counterparts. To put the 
point differently, democracies are far from immune to authoritarian governance, the 
revocation of civil liberties, and the use of repression. Indeed, our long historical 
perspective on Greece shows the typological division of political systems into 
democracies and non-democracies to be a problematic framework for exploring state 
punitiveness regardless of whether one does so by reference to recent decades, where 
hybrid authoritarian democracies and ‘electoral authoritarianism’ are known to have 
become more common around the world, or across more extensive timeframes. 
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